考虑奖惩分配激励机制的环境污染第三方治理演化博弈

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Abstract To solve the problem of information asymmetry in third-party governance of environmental pollution under the background of fuzzy attribution of environmental responsibility, the tripartite evolutionary game model of polluting enterprise, third-party governance enterprise and local government was constructed by introducing the mechanism of incentive policy system on the strategic choice of parties and assessing the basic conditions for the system to achieve evolutionary stable state in different situations. Then, the scientificity of the game subject and system evolution stability analysis is verified with numerical simulation. The study indicates that, setting a reasonable amount of rewards and punishments and their distribution ratio, enhancing the reputational benefits of both enterprises, and controlling the cost of local government supervision are the key factors that affect the strategies choice of the three-parties. The reward and punishment distribution incentive mechanism designed according to the “responsibility sharing principle” demonstrates its effectiveness in promoting the trust and cooperation between the principal and agent; and the polluting enterprise shows stronger income sensitivity than the third-party governance enterprise does. To this end, the main responsibility status of polluting enterprise needs to be implemented, and the proportion of rewards and punishments shall be increased as much as possible.

Key words： third-party governance of environmental pollution reward and punishment distribution incentive responsibility sharing evolutionary game

Received: 01 September 2022

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X505

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	HUANG Ren-hui
	GAO Ming

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HUANG Ren-hui,GAO Ming. Introducing an incentive mechanism of reward and punishment distribution to the evolutionary game of the third-party governance of environmental pollution[J]. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2023, 43(4): 2069-2080.

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http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/EN/Y2023/V43/I4/2069

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