Abstract：To study the effects of penalty design on pollution levy program enforcement in China, the optimal decision model of a risk-neutral firm was established and the economic experiment was designed to testify the hypothesis. Effects of penalty expectation (monitoring and penalties) on individual emissions and violations were negative and significant; A firm’s marginal abatement costs of increased emissions had negative and significant effect on its choices of emissions and has no effect on its violations; Compared with penalties, monitoring frequency had larger impact on compliance rates. Policy makers should increase monitoring frequency and penalty to reduce violation and stimulate abatement. Current linear penalty functions should be changed to step-up ones. In addition, more enforcement resource should not be put on the firms with higher marginal abatement costs, but on those with larger emission volumes.
刘蓓蓓, 于洋, 毕军, 张炳, 葛俊杰. 以经济学实验研究处罚机制对排污收费政策执行的影响[J]. 中国环境科学, 2009, 29(6): 600-604.
LIU Bei-Bei, YU Yang, BI Jun, ZHANG Bing, GE Jun-Jie. Effects of penalty design on enforcing pollution levy program: based on ecological experimental analysis.. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2009, 29(6): 600-604.
