集中式环境执法体制改革的环境治理效应——基于192个城市的“准实验”

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Abstract The traditional environmental enforcement framework is fraught with conflicts stemming from the dichotomy between fragmented enforcement and integrated governance, the tension between local protectionism and stringent environmental regulation, and the disparity between imbalanced information structures and the need for precise governance. These conflicts have led to weakened environmental regulation and a concomitant decline in environmental quality. In response, the Chinese central government has initiated a centralized environmental enforcement system reform (EESR). The theoretical underpinnings of this reform are rooted in the integration of functions to mitigate the fragmentation, the reconfiguration of power to prevent local interference, and the leveraging of technology to facilitate comprehensive and transparent oversight. Based on this, we have constructed annual panel data for 192 prefecture-level cities spanning the period from 2013 to 2022. Utilizing a Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach, we found that EESR has significantly led to stricter environmental enforcement, with a post-EESR increase of 49.8% in environmental administrative penalties levied by cities. However, economic factors would modulate the efficacy of the EESR. Cities closer to the western regions exhibit a less pronounced positive impact of the reform on environmental enforcement. Further analysis indicated that the EESR has had a significant positive effect on air quality, with substantial reductions in concentrations of PM_2.5, PM₁₀, and SO₂ following its implementation. This study offers guidance for the further development and improvement of the EESR in later stages, as well as insights into understanding the positive effects of a centralized environmental control system.

Key words： environmental enforcement system reform environmental centralization Difference-in-Differences (DID)approach environmental enforcement air quality

Received: 09 August 2024

PACS:

X32

Corresponding Authors: 刘哲,教授,zheliu@xjtu.edu.cn E-mail: zheliu@xjtu.edu.cn

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	TANG Yu
	LIU Zhe
	TAO Xiao-lei

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TANG Yu,LIU Zhe,TAO Xiao-lei. The environmental governance effect of the centralized environmental enforcement system reform: A quasi-experiment based on 192 cities[J]. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2025, 45(3): 1745-1753.

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http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/EN/ OR http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/EN/Y2025/V45/I3/1745

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