Under the consideration of emission reduction efficiency and the purpose of maximizing the economic surplus in the carbon market, a two-stage dynamic game mechanism between the government and duopoly enterprises was constructed, and the effects of graded and progressive punishment mechanism on the power generation, profits of large and small enterprises and economic surplus were studied. The results showed that with the increase of penalty coefficient, if the large power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation, total profit and economic surplus decreased by 7.47%, 15.34% and 5.88%; if the small power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation decreased by 1.43%, the total profit decreased by 3.39% or increased by 0.03%, and the economic surplus increased by 0.13%; if the large power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 16.35%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 15.34%; if the small power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 3.39%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit increased by 0.03%. Therefore, when designing a punishment mechanism for the power generation industry, we should increase the penalties and set up a graded and progressive punishment mechanism, according to the enterprise scale and carbon market participation, and an effective supervision system should be established.
魏琦, 李林静. 碳市场发电企业违约分级累进处罚机制研究[J]. 中国环境科学, 2020, 40(2): 919-928.
WEI Qi, LI Lin-jing. Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2020, 40(2): 919-928.
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