中国环境科学
 
 
中国环境科学  2020, Vol. 40 Issue (2): 919-928    DOI:
环境影响评价与管理 最新目录| 下期目录| 过刊浏览| 高级检索 |
碳市场发电企业违约分级累进处罚机制研究
魏琦, 李林静
兰州理工大学经济管理学院, 甘肃 兰州 730050
Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market
WEI Qi, LI Lin-jing
School of Economic and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou 730050, China

全文: PDF (732 KB)   HTML (1 KB) 
输出: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
摘要 

在确保减排效率的前提下,以全国碳市场中的发电企业为研究对象,以实现碳市场经济剩余最大化为目标,构建政府和双寡头企业的两阶段动态博弈模型,研究分级累进处罚机制对大型和小型企业发电量、利润的影响,以及在实行分级累进处罚机制的碳市场中经济剩余的实现.算例结果表明:随着罚款系数的增加,违约企业是大型发电企业时,总发电量、企业总利润和经济剩余大幅减少7.47%、15.34%、5.88%;违约企业是小型发电企业时,总发电量小幅减少1.43%,企业总利润小幅减少3.39%或上升0.03%,经济剩余小幅上升0.13%;大型违约企业未参与碳交易时,企业总利润大幅减少16.35%,参与碳交易时,企业总利润小幅减少15.34%;小型违约企业未参与碳交易时,企业总利润大幅减少3.39%,参与碳交易时,企业总利润小幅上升0.03%,分级累进处罚机制能够有效的遏制企业的违约行为.因此,在设计发电行业处罚机制时,应加大处罚力度;设置分级累进处罚机制,分别根据企业规模和碳市场参与度进行分级和累进,并建立有效的监管制度.

服务
把本文推荐给朋友
加入我的书架
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章
魏琦
李林静
关键词 碳排放权交易处罚机制分级累进动态博弈    
Abstract

Under the consideration of emission reduction efficiency and the purpose of maximizing the economic surplus in the carbon market, a two-stage dynamic game mechanism between the government and duopoly enterprises was constructed, and the effects of graded and progressive punishment mechanism on the power generation, profits of large and small enterprises and economic surplus were studied. The results showed that with the increase of penalty coefficient, if the large power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation, total profit and economic surplus decreased by 7.47%, 15.34% and 5.88%; if the small power enterprise was defaulted, the total power generation decreased by 1.43%, the total profit decreased by 3.39% or increased by 0.03%, and the economic surplus increased by 0.13%; if the large power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 16.35%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 15.34%; if the small power enterprise was not participated in carbon trading, the total profit decreased by 3.39%; if it was participated in carbon trading, the total profit increased by 0.03%. Therefore, when designing a punishment mechanism for the power generation industry, we should increase the penalties and set up a graded and progressive punishment mechanism, according to the enterprise scale and carbon market participation, and an effective supervision system should be established.

Key wordscarbon emission trading    punishment mechanism    graded and progressive    dynamic game   
收稿日期: 2019-07-15     
PACS: X196  
  F205  
基金资助:

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71563026)

通讯作者: 魏琦,教授,weiq@lut.cn     E-mail: weiq@lut.cn
作者简介: 魏琦(1975-),女,甘肃兰州人,教授,硕士,主要从事应用经济研究.发表论文40余篇.
引用本文:   
魏琦, 李林静. 碳市场发电企业违约分级累进处罚机制研究[J]. 中国环境科学, 2020, 40(2): 919-928. WEI Qi, LI Lin-jing. Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2020, 40(2): 919-928.
链接本文:  
http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/CN/      或     http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/CN/Y2020/V40/I2/919
中国环境科学
友情链接: 中国科学技术协会 中国环境科学学会 中国知网 万方数据
版权所有 © 2010 《中国环境科学》编辑部  地址:北京市海淀区红联南村54号(100082)  电话、传真:(010)62215145  
E-mail:zghjkx1981@126.com;zghjkx1981@chinacses.org;zghjkx1981@188.com
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发  技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn