The evolution game analysis of enterprise's strategic environmental governance with the effect of different combinations of reward policies and punishment policies
HUANG Xin-huan1, BAO Yan-zhen1, CHEN Yong-zhi2, CAI Bin-qing3
1. School of Economics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350117, China; 2. Fujian S & T Consulting Center, Fuzhou 350005, China; 3. School of Management, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, China
Abstract：The reasonable combination of reward policies and punishment policies was designed to prevent enterprises from conducting strategic environmental governance. In this paper, an evolutionary game model was conducted to analyze the interrelationship between the local government and the enterprise based on the framework of motivation-behavior-performance. Firstly, the impacts of different combinations of reward policies and punishment policies on the evolution of the enterprise's strategic environmental governance behavior were explored. Secondly, the conditions for system's evolutionary stability with the effect of different combinations of reward policies and punishment policies were discussed. Thirdly, the impacts of each parameter on the probability of implementing proactive environmental governance were analyzed in the case of the optimal combination policies. The obtained results showed that if the combination policy of static punishment and static subsidy was implemented by the local government, the system could not gradually stabilize at the central point; the combination policies such as “dynamic punishments and static subsidy”, “static punishment and dynamic subsidies”, and “dynamic punishments and dynamic subsidies” were implemented, there existed the system's evolutionary stability strategy. If the reputation gain obtained by proactive environmental governance was smaller than the threshold value, the combination of dynamic punishments and static subsidy was the optimal collaborative policy. If the reputation gain was greater than the threshold value, the combination of dynamic punishments and dynamic subsidies was the optimal collaborative policy. When the subsidy amount of proactive governance behavior was too high, the incentive effect of the subsidy was distorted, and the subsidy effect was reversed.
黄新焕, 鲍艳珍, 陈勇智, 蔡彬清. 奖惩组合政策下企业策略性环境治理演化博弈[J]. 中国环境科学, 2023, 43(7): 3808-3820.
HUANG Xin-huan, BAO Yan-zhen, CHEN Yong-zhi, CAI Bin-qing. The evolution game analysis of enterprise's strategic environmental governance with the effect of different combinations of reward policies and punishment policies. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2023, 43(7): 3808-3820.
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