四方主体参与碳减排的演化博弈研究

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摘要聚焦于多主体共同参与的企业减排治理模式,构建中央政府-地方政府-企业-环境NGO的四方演化博弈模型,分析各个均衡点的稳定性,并用Matlab软件进行数据仿真,模拟不同参数变化下对四方博弈主体的策略选择影响.结果表明,该博弈系统16个纯策略均衡点中存在5个条件稳定点.博弈主体的策略选择取决于该策略下的相对净收益,相对净收益越大,相关主体越倾向于选择该策略.增大中央政府对地方政府的转移支付,提高对地方政府不落实的惩罚都能够促进地方政府积极演化,使系统更快地演化至稳定状态.提高企业的减排补助短期内有助于低碳经济的发展,但不是长期治理模式,过高的减排补助会使地方政府消极演化,最终博弈系统达不到理想的稳定状态.另外提高对于环境NGO的披露奖励也能制约企业进行积极演化,有助于系统更快演化到理想的稳定状态.最后,针对中央政府、地方政府、企业和环境NGO分别提出相应建议.

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	崔宁
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关键词 ：低碳经济, 企业碳减排, 四方主体, 演化博弈

Abstract：This study focused on the collaborative emission reduction governance model that involved multiple entities, wherein an evolutionary game model was constructed among the central government, local government, enterprises, and environmental NGOs. The stability of each equilibrium point was meticulously analyzed, and data simulation was conducted using Matlab software to explore the influence of varying parameters on the strategic choices of the four game participants. The findings revealed that out of the 16pure strategy equilibrium points in the game system, five were conditionally stable. The choice of strategy by the game participants was found to be dependent on the relative net benefit of that strategy, with a greater relative net benefit increasing the likelihood of the strategy being chosen by the relevant participants. It was observed that enhancing the central government's transfer payments to local governments and escalating penalties for non-implementation by local governments could stimulate their active evolution, enabling the system to transition to a stable state more swiftly. While it was noted that increasing enterprises' emission reduction subsidies could foster the growth of a low-carbon economy in the short term, it was not seen as a sustainable governance model. Excessive emission reduction subsidies were found to potentially trigger passive evolution of local governments, preventing the game system from achieving the ideal stable state. Furthermore, it was discovered that augmenting disclosure rewards for environmental NGOs could also induce enterprises to evolve proactively, facilitating the system's faster evolution to the desired stable state. In conclusion, the study proposed respective suggestions for the central government, local governments, enterprises, and environmental NGOs, thereby offering theoretical insights for the advancement of China's low-carbon economy.

Key words： low carbon economy enterprise carbon emission reduction four parties evolutionary game

收稿日期: 2023-04-11

PACS:

X32

基金资助:国家重点研发计划项目(2019YFC180380103);2023年度辽宁省高校基本科研项目(JYTMS20230828)

通讯作者: 崔宁,副教授,yulin_2@163.com E-mail: yulin_2@163.com

作者简介: 崔宁(1980-),女,辽宁营口人,副教授,博士,主要从事工业工程与管理、社会经济管理等方面的研究.发表论文20余篇.yulin_2@163.com.

引用本文:

崔宁, 周宇, 赵晓亮. 四方主体参与碳减排的演化博弈研究[J]. 中国环境科学, 2023, 43(12): 6788-6802. CUI Ning, ZHOU Yu, ZHAO Xiao-liang. Research on the evolutionary game of carbon emission reduction involving four entities. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2023, 43(12): 6788-6802.

链接本文:

http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/CN/Y2023/V43/I12/6788

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