组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

高旭阔; 席子云

PDF(1107 KB)

中国环境科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (12) : 5484-5492.

环境影响评价与管理

组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

高旭阔, 席子云

作者信息 +

Evolutionary game of government and enterprise pollution discharge behavior under combined measures

GAO Xu-kuo, XI Zi-yun

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

为研究排污企业应对不同惩罚和补贴组合措施的行为策略，将演化博弈理论与系统动力学方法结合，构建基于政府与排污企业双方的演化博弈模型.以政府和排污企业双方利益为核心，对其在不同惩罚和补贴措施下的企业行为策略和演化稳定性进行分析.结果显示，在静态惩罚补贴措施下，政府和企业策略行为无法达到演化稳定点，政府静态政策不会对企业合法排污行为产生推动作用.在动态惩罚补贴措施下，动态惩罚和动态补贴措施对推动企业合法排污行为更为有效，政府可根据排污企业行为制定双边动态策略.

Abstract

In order to study the behavior strategies of sewage enterprises when they are facing the different punishment and subsidy combination measures, the Evolutionary Game Theory and system dynamic method were combined to construct an evolutionary game model which took both government and sewage enterprises into account. The model took the interests of both government and sewage enterprises as the core, and was used to evaluate the behavior strategies of sewage enterprises and evolutionary stability under the different punishments and subsidy measures. The results indicated that the strategic behavior of the government and enterprises cannot reach the point of evolutionary stability under the static punishments and subsidy measures, and the legal discharge of enterprises was not promoted by the static government policies. In contrast, the legal discharge by the sewage enterprises was more efficiently promoted under a dynamic regulation of punishment and subsidy. Hence, the bilateral dynamic policy could be formulated by the government in accordance with the behavior of sewage enterprises.

导出引用

高旭阔, 席子云. 组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈[J]. 中国环境科学. 2020, 40(12): 5484-5492

GAO Xu-kuo, XI Zi-yun. Evolutionary game of government and enterprise pollution discharge behavior under combined measures[J]. China Environmental Science. 2020, 40(12): 5484-5492

中图分类号： X32

参考文献

[1] 许静,王永桂,陈岩,等.中国突发水环境污染事件时空分布特征[J]. 中国环境科学, 2018,38(12):4566-4575. Xu J, Wang Y G, Chen Y, et al. Spatial distribution and temporal variation of sudden water pollution incidents in China[J]. China Environmental Science, 2018,38(12):4566-4575.
[2] 吴娟娟,卞建民,万罕立,等.松嫩平原地下水氮污染健康风险评估[J]. 中国环境科学, 2019,39(8):3493-3500. Wu J J, Bian J M, Wan H L, et al. Health risk assessment of groundwater nitrogen pollution in Songnen Plain[J]. China Environmental Science, 2019,39(8):3493-3500.
[3] 徐进,黄廷林,李凯,等.李家河水库污染物来源及水体分层对水质的影响[J]. 环境科学, 2019,40(7):3049-3057. Xu J, Huang T L, Li K, et al. Pollution sources and the stratification effects on water quality in Lijiahe Reservoir[J]. Environmental Scinence, 2019,40(7):3049-3057.
[4] 张林,李存林,李丹.不确定理论下带惩罚机制的城市污水处理期望收益模型[J]. 中国环境科学, 2018,38(7):2794-2800. Zhang L, Li C L, Li D. Expected return model of urban sewage treatment with penalty mechanism under uncertainty theory[J]. China Environmental Science, 2018,38(7):2794-2800.
[5] 张强,冯悦,张晋,等.生态合作中监管机制与地方政府演化博弈分析[J]. 环境科学与技术, 2018,41(8):199-204. Zhang Q, Feng Y, Zhang J, et al. Analysis of the regulatory mechanism and the evolution game of local government in ecological cooperation[J]. Environmental Science & Technology, 2018,41(8):199-204.
[6] 张彦博,寇坡,张丹宁,等.企业污染减排过程中的政企合谋问题研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018,27(11):184-192. Zhang Y B, Kou P, Zhang D N, et al. Research on collusion between the government and the enterprise in pollution abatement[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018,27(11):184-192.
[7] 张婕,刘枚莲.基于前景理论的水污染治理政企合谋监管[J]. 系统工程, 2017,35(2):45-50. Zhang J, Liu M L.Supervise Management on collusion between government and enterprise in water pollution control based on prospect theory[J]. Systems Engineering, 2017,35(2):45-50.
[8] Tevapitak K, Helmsing A H J B. The interaction between local governments and stakeholders in environmental management:The case of water pollution by SMEs in Thailand[J]. Journal of environmental management, 2019,247:840-848.
[9] 潘峰,西宝,王琳.基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2015,35(6):1393-1404. Pan F, Xi B, Wang L. Analysis on environmental regulation strategy of local government based on evolutionary game theory[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2015,35(6):1393-1404.
[10] Jiang K, You D, Merrill R, et al. Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization:An evolutionary game theoretical approach[J]. Journal of cleaner production, 2019,214:902-915.
[11] 胡震云,陈晨,王慧敏,等.水污染治理的微分博弈及策略研究[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2014,24(5):93-101. Hu Z Y, Chen C, Wang H M, et al. Study on the differential game and strategy of water pollution control[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2014,24(5):93-101.
[12] 张国兴,张绪涛,汪应洛,等.节能减排政府补贴的最优边界问题研究[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014,17(11):129-138. Zhang G X, Zhang X T, Wang Y L, et al. Analysis of optimal boundary of government subsidies for energy conservation and emission reduction[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2014,17(11):129-138.
[13] 林思宇,陈佳斌,石磊,等.环境税征收对小微企业的影响——基于湖南省小微工业企业实证数据分析[J]. 中国环境科学, 2016,36(7):2212-2218. Lin S Y, Chen J B, Shi L, et al. Impact of environmental taxes on small and micro businesses-an empirical research in Hunan Province[J]. China Environmental Science, 2016,26(7):2212-2218.
[14] Sun H, Wan Y, Zhang L, et al. Evolutionary game of the green investment in a two-echelon supply chain under a government subsidy mechanism[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019,235:1315-1326.
[15] 张华,魏晓平.绿色悖论抑或倒逼减排——环境规制对碳排放影响的双重效应[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2014,24(9):21-29. Zhang H, Wei X P. Green paradox or forced emission-reduction:Dual effect of environmental regulation on carbon emissions[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2014,24(9):21-29.
[16] Moledina, Amyaz A, et al. Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms:prices versus quantities[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2003,45(2):356-376.
[17] 焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017,25(10):140-150. Jiao J L, Chen J, Li L L, et al. A study of local governments' and enterprises' actions in the carbon emission mechanism of subsidy or punishment based on the evolutionary game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017,25(10):140-150.
[18] Chen W, Hu Z H. Using evolutionary game theory to study governments and manufacturers' behavioral strategies under various carbon taxes and subsidies[J]. Journal of cleaner production, 2018,201:123-141.
[19] 潘峰,王琳.环境治理中的政府监查与企业治污行为研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017,26(2):93-99. Pan F, Wang L. Research on government supervision and enterprise pollution control in environmental management[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017,26(2):93-99.
[20] 王先甲,全吉,刘伟兵.有限理性下的演化博弈与合作机制研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2011,31(S1):82-93. Wang X J, Quan J, Liu W B. Study on evolutionary games and cooperation within the framework of bounded rationality[J]. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2011,31(S1):82-93.
[21] Hofbauer, Josef, William H, et al. Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007,132:47-69.
[22] 朱庆华,王一雷,田一辉.基于系统动力学的地方政府与制造企业碳减排演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014,23(3):71-82. Zhu Q H, Wang Y L, Tian Y H. Analysis of an evolutionary game between local governments and manufacturing enterprises under carbon reduction policies based on system dynamics[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014,23(3):71-82.
[23] Taylor P D, Jonker L B. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics[J]. Mathematical biosciences, 1978,40(1/2):145-156.
[24] 王志强,张樵民,有维宝.装配式建筑政府激励策略的演化博弈与仿真研究——基于政府补贴视角下[J]. 系统工程, 2019,37(3):151-158. Wang Z Q, Zhang Q M, You W B. An evolutionary game and simulation study on government incentive strategy of prefabricated buildings-From the perspective of government subsidy[J]. System Engineering, 2019,37(3):151-158.
[25] 中华人民共和国中央人民政府.中国人民共和国水污染防治法实施细则[EB/OL]. http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-08/06/content_21045.htm, 2000-03-20. The central people's government of the people's republic of China. Detailed rules for the implementation of the water pollution prevention and control law of the People's Republic of China[EB/OL]. http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-08/06/content_21045. htm, 2000-03-20.
[26] 陕西统计局.陕西省统计年鉴[M]. 北京:中国统计出版社, 2000-2008. Shanxi provincial bureau of statistics. Shanxi statistical yearbook[M]. Beijing:China statistics press, 2000-2008.
[27] 中华人民共和国中央人民政府.中华人民共和国水污染防治法[EB/OL]. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-02/28/content_905050.htm,2008-02-28. The central people's government of the people's republic of China. Water pollution prevention and control law of the People's Republic of China[EB/OL]. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-02/28/content_905050.htm, 2008-02-28.
[28] 中华人民共和国生态环境部.关于《调整排污费征收标准等有关问题的通知》[EB/OL]. http://zfs.mee.gov.cn/hjjj/gjfbdjjzc/201603/t20160331_334524.shtml,2015-03-06. Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People's Republicof China. Notice on adjusting the standards for the collection of pollutant discharge fees[EB/OL]. http://zfs.mee.gov.cn/hjjj/gjfbdjjzc/201603/t20160331_334524.shtml, 2015-03-06/2015-07-01.