碳减排政策组合使用效能差异及提升策略

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摘要采用演化博弈理论,根据碳交易碳税是否参与,设计四种碳减排政策工具使用情景.基于稳定性分析,阐释碳减排政策组合使用对企业碳减排的影响机理和作用机制,通过敏感性分析厘清博弈系统主要敏感性因素及影响方向.以全国碳交易市场建设案例为实证对象,仿真碳交易和混合碳政策使用情景博弈主体演化轨迹,识别关键因素对系统的影响程度,并提出动态递增税率和动态奖惩策略优化混合碳政策使用情景策略.研究发现:相较无碳交易无碳税、有碳交易无碳税、无碳交易有碳税情景,混合碳政策使用情景碳减排效能最佳;当前我国碳交易市场建设仍有待于加强,政企双方未达到(监管,碳减排)最优状态,成本和惩罚因素对博弈系统影响明显,补贴因素作用方向不确定;混合碳政策情景融入动态递增税率和动态奖惩策略,系统呈螺旋式上升,获得(监管,碳减排)稳定均衡点,其中动态补贴-动态惩罚为最佳奖惩策略.

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	杨霞
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	蒋怀印

关键词 ：碳减排, 政策组合, 演化博弈, 效能差异, 动态奖惩

Abstract：This study creates four scenarios for the employment of carbon emission reduction policy tools, depending on whether the two emission reduction policies of carbon trading and carbon tax are engaged. During this process, evolutionary game theory is applied. The stability analysis of the game system has provided a thorough explanation of the influence mechanism and action mechanism of the combination of carbon emission reduction policies on enterprise carbon emission reduction. On this premise, we conduct sensitivity analysis to discover the primary sensitivity elements that influence the game system's path. In the empirical analysis section, we take the case of national carbon trading market construction as the empirical object, simulate the evolution trajectory of the main body of carbon trading and mixed carbon policy use scenario game, deeply analyze the influence degree of key factors on the system, and put forward the dynamic increasing tax rate and dynamic reward and punishment strategy, optimize the carbon emission reduction efficiency improvement strategy of mixed carb. The study found that: when compared to no carbon trading without carbon tax, carbon trading without carbon tax, and no carbon trading with carbon tax, the mixed carbon policy use scenario has the highest carbon emission reduction efficiency. Second, the current construction of China's carbon trading market need further strengthening. The government and businesses have not achieved the optimal state (supervision, carbon emission reduction). The cost and penalty elements have a clear impact on the game system, however the direction of subsidy factors is unknown. Third, dynamic incentive and punishment schemes are combined with dynamic incremental tax rates in the mixed carbon policy scenario. The system spirals upward and reaches a stable equilibrium position (carbon emission reduction, supervision), where the optimal reward and punishment scheme is dynamic subsidy-dynamic punishment.

Key words： carbon emission reduction policy combination evolutionary game theory efficiency difference dynamic rewards and punishments

收稿日期: 2024-08-11

PACS:

X196

基金资助:国家自然科学基金资助项目(72271005);教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(22YJAZH025)

作者简介: 杨霞(1988-),女,安徽芜湖人,副教授,安徽理工大学博士研究生,主要从事资源经济与管理、演化博弈研究.发表论文10余篇.xyang8731959@163.com.

引用本文:

杨霞, 何刚, 张世玉, 蒋怀印. 碳减排政策组合使用效能差异及提升策略[J]. 中国环境科学, 2025, 45(3): 1699-1712. YANG Xia, HE Gang, ZHANG Shi-yu, JIANG Huai-yin. Research on the efficiency difference and promotion strategy of combining carbon emission reduction policies. CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCECE, 2025, 45(3): 1699-1712.

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http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.zghjkx.com.cn/CN/Y2025/V45/I3/1699

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