Differential game and multi-scenario simulation of regional carbon emission reduction cooperation
YUAN Liang1, QI Yu-zhi1, HE Wei-jun1, WU Xia1,2
1. School of Economics and Management, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443000, China; 2. School of Law and Public Administration of China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443000, China
Abstract：Based on the perspective of multi-stakeholders, a dynamic differential game model of regional carbon emission reduction composed of carbon surplus government, carbon deficit government, and carbon emission enterprises was established, and the strategic equilibrium solution of multi-stakeholders was explored. In addition, the changes in multiple stakeholders' strategic choices, effort level, and social welfare under the two decision-making backgrounds of cost-sharing and no cost-sharing were compared and analyzed. On the basis of the above, a system dynamics model for multi-scenario simulation was constructed. The results show that: (1) Under the cost-sharing policy, the emission reduction efforts, benefits, and social welfare levels of all stakeholders have been improved. (2) The choice of emission reduction strategies of multiple stakeholders has an interactive impact, which is affected by the cost-benefit relationship of each stakeholder, and the change of cooperation income is also affected by the purchase proportion and reward proportion. (3) The increase in marginal income enhances the enthusiasm for emission reduction, and the attenuation coefficient of emission reduction benefits, emission reduction costs are negatively related to the level of effort. (4) Social welfare effect, marginal income, and carbon emission reduction have a great impact on the efforts of carbon deficit governments and carbon emission enterprises. (5) Carbon deficit government's carbon emission purchase proportion has a great impact on the carbon surplus government's emission reduction efforts. (6) Carbon deficit government incentives for emission reduction, corporate social reputation, and the external impact of regional carbon emission reduction have an important impact on the emission reduction efforts of carbon emission enterprises. Based on this, this paper puts forward the policies and suggestions of cooperative emission reduction by multiple stakeholders, which have theoretical value and practical significance for promoting the realization of the "Dual Carbon" goal.
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